66 research outputs found
Higher-Order Glitches Free Implementation of the AES using Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols - Extended Version
Higher-order side channel attacks (HO-SCA) is a powerful technique against cryptographic implementations and the design of appropriate countermeasures is nowadays an important topic. In parallel, another class of attacks, called glitches attacks, have been investigated which exploit the hardware glitches phenomena occurring during the physical execution of algorithms. Some solutions have been proposed to counteract HO-SCA at any order or to defeat glitches attacks, but no work has until now focussed on the definition of a sound countermeasure thwarting both attacks. We introduce in this paper a circuit model in which side-channel resistance in presence of glitches effects can be characterized. This allows us to construct the first glitches free HO-SCA countermeasure. The new construction can be built from any Secure Multi-Party Computation protocol and, as an illustration, we propose to apply the protocol introduced by Ben-Or et al. at STOC in 1988. The adaptation of the latter protocol to the context of side-channel analysis results in a completely new higher-order masking scheme, particularly interesting when addressing resistance in the presence of glitches. An application of our scheme to the AES block cipher is detailed, as well as an information theoretic evaluation of the new masking function that we call polynomial masking
First-Order Side-Channel Attacks on the Permutation Tables Countermeasure âExtended Versionâ
The use of random permutation tables as a side-channel attack countermeasure was recently proposed by Coron [6]. The countermeasure operates by ensuring that during the execution of an algorithm, each intermediate variable that is handled is in a permuted form described by the random permutation tables. In this paper, we examine the application of this countermeasure to the AES algorithm as described in [6], and show that certain operations admit first-order side-channel leakage. New side-channel attacks are developed to exploit these flaws, using correlation-based and mutual information-based methods. The attacks have been verified in simulation, and in practice on a smart card
On the Practical Security of a Leakage Resilient Masking Scheme
At TCC 2012, Dziembowski and Faust show how to construct leakage resilient circuits using secret sharing based on the inner product [2]. At Asiacrypt 2012, Ballash et al. turned the latter construction into an efficient masking scheme and they apply it to protect an implementation of AES against side-channel attacks [1]. The so-called Inner-Product masking (IPmasking for short) was claimed to be secure with respect to two different security models: the -limited security model (Section 4 of [1]), and the dth-order security model (see definitions p.8 of [1]). In the former model, the security proof makes sense for a sharing dimension which is acknowledged impractical by the authors. In the latter model, the scheme is claimed secure up to the order . In this note, we contradict the dth-order security claim by exhibiting a 1st-order flaw in the masking algorithm for any chosen sharing dimension n
Breaking Cryptographic Implementations Using Deep Learning Techniques
Template attack is the most common and powerful profiled side channel attack. It relies on a realistic assumption regarding the noise of the device under attack: the probability density function of the data is a multivariate Gaussian distribution. To relax this assumption, a recent line of research has investigated new profiling approaches mainly by applying machine learning techniques. The obtained results are commensurate, and in some particular cases better, compared to template attack. In this work, we propose to continue this recent line of research by applying more sophisticated profiling techniques based on deep learning. Our experimental results confirm the overwhelming advantages of the resulting new attacks when targeting both unprotected and protected cryptographic implementations
Success through confidence: Evaluating the effectiveness of a side-channel attack
Side-channel attacks usually apply a divide-and-conquer strategy, separately recovering different parts of the secret. Their efficiency in practice relies on the adversary ability to precisely assess the success or unsucces of each of these recoveries. This makes the study of the attack success rate a central problem in side-channel analysis. In tis paper we tackle this issue in two different settings for the most popular attack, namely the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). In the first setting, we assume that the targeted subkey is known and we compare the state of the art formulae expressing the success rate as a function of the leakage noise and the algebraic properties of the cryptographic primitive. We also make the link between these formulae and the recent work of Fei et al. at CHES 2012. In the second setting, the subkey is no longer assumed to be known and we introduce the notion of confidence level in an attack result, allowing for the study of different heuristics. Through experiments, we show that the rank evolution of a subkey hypothesis can be exploited to compute a better confidence than considering only the final result
Linear Repairing Codes and Side-Channel Attacks
International audienceTo strengthen the resistance of countermeasures based on secret sharing, several works have suggested to use the scheme introduced by Shamir in 1978, which proposes to use the evaluation of a random d-degree polynomial into n d+1 public points to share the sensitive data. Applying the same principles used against the classical Boolean sharing, all these works have assumed that the most efficient attack strategy was to exploit the minimum number of shares required to rebuild the sensitive value; which is d + 1 if the reconstruction is made with Lagrange's interpolation. In this paper, we highlight first an important difference between Boolean and Shamir's sharings which implies that, for some signal-to-noise ratio, it is more advantageous for the adversary to observe strictly more than d + 1 shares. We argue that this difference is related to the existence of so-called exact linear repairing codes, which themselves come with reconstruction formulae that need (much) less information (counted in bits) than Lagrange's interpolation. In particular, this result implies that, contrary to what was believed, the choice of the public points in Shamir's sharing has an impact on the countermeasure strength. As another contribution, we exhibit a positive impact of the existence of linear exact repairing schemes; we indeed propose to use them to improve the state-of-the-art multiplication algorithms dedicated to Shamir's sharing. We argue that the improvement can be effective when the multiplication operation in the base field is at least two times smaller than in its sub-fields
Higher-order Masking and Shuffling for Software Implementations of Block Ciphers
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) is a powerful side channel key recovery attack that efficiently breaks block ciphers implementations. In software, two main techniques are usually applied to thwart them: masking and operations shuffling. To benefit from the advantages of the two techniques, recent works have proposed to combine them. However, the schemes which have been
designed until now only provide limited resistance levels and some
advanced DPA attacks have turned out to break them. In this paper,
we investigate the combination of masking and shuffling. We moreover
extend the approach with the use of higher-order masking and we
show that it enables to significantly improve the security level of
such a scheme. We first conduct a theoretical analysis in which the
efficiency of advanced DPA attacks targeting masking and shuffling
is quantified. Based on this analysis, we design a generic scheme
combining higher-order masking and shuffling. This scheme is
scalable and its security parameters can be chosen according to any
desired resistance level. As an illustration, we apply it to protect
a software implementation of AES for which we give several
security/efficiency trade-offs
Algebraic Decomposition for Probing Security
The probing security model is very popular to prove the side-channel security of cryptographic implementations protected by masking. A common approach to secure nonlinear functions in this model is to represent them as polynomials over a binary field and to secure their nonlinear multiplications thanks to a method introduced by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner at Crypto 2003. Several schemes based on this approach have been published, leading to the recent proposal of Coron, Roy and Vivek which is currently the best known method when no particular assumption is made on the algebraic structure of the function. In the present paper, we revisit this idea by trading nonlinear multiplications for low-degree functions. Specifically, we introduce an algebraic decomposition approach in which a nonlinear function is represented as a sequence of functions with low algebraic degrees. We therefore focus on the probing-secure evaluation of such low-degree functions and we introduce three novel methods to tackle this particular issue. The paper concludes with a comparative analysis of the proposals, which shows that our algebraic decomposition method outperforms the method of Coron, Roy and Vivek in several realistic contexts
Affine Masking against Higher-Order Side Channel Analysis
In the last decade, an effort has been made by the research community to find efficient ways to thwart side channel analysis (SCA) against physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms. A common countermeasure for implementations of block ciphers is Boolean masking which randomizes by the bitwise addition of one or several random value(s) to the variables to be protected. However, advanced techniques called higher-order SCA attacks exist that overcome such a countermeasure. These attacks are greatly favored by the very nature of Boolean masking. In this paper, we revisit the affine masking initially introduced by Von Willich in 2001 as an alternative to Boolean masking. We show how to apply it to AES at the cost of a small timing overhead compared to Boolean masking. We then conduct an in-depth analysis pinpointing the leakage reduction implied by affine masking. Our results clearly show that the proposed scheme provides an excellent performance-security trade-off to protect AES against higher-order SCA
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